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Abstract—The MITRE ATT&CK Framework provides a rich
and actionable repository of adversarial tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP). However, this information would be highly
useful for attack diagnosis (i.e., forensics) and mitigation (i.e.,
intrusion response) if we can reliably construct technique asso-
ciations that will enable predicting unobserved attack techniques
based on observed ones. In this paper, we present our statistical
machine learning analysis on APT and Software attack data
reported by MITRE ATT&CK to infer the technique clustering
that represents the significant correlation that can be used for
technique prediction. Due to the complex multidimensional rela-
tionships between techniques, many of the traditional clustering
methods could not obtain usable associations. Our approach, using
hierarchical clustering for inferring attack technique associations
with 95% confidence, provides statistically significant and explain-
able technique correlations. Our analysis discovers 98 different
technique associations (i.e., clusters) for both APT and Software
attacks. Our evaluation results show that 78% of the techniques
associated by our algorithm exhibit significant mutual information
that indicates reasonably high predictability.
I. INTRODUCTION
As cyber attacks increase in volume and sophistication, the
state of the art of cybersecurity solutions is still lagging behind.
According to Red Canary, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
attacks have increased from approximately 500 attacks per year
in 2009 to almost 1500 APT attacks per year in 2016. Verizon
and SANS reported that in 2017 about 68% of attacks went
undiscovered, and even after detection, about 77% of these
attacks took hours to days to get remediated. The lack of timely
detection and response is mainly caused by the insufficient
support of attack action correlations and prediction to allow
for proactive intrusion investigation and mitigation.
MITRE has created a public knowledge-based repository of
adversary tactics and techniques called MITRE ATT&CK. As
of February 2020, MITRE ATT&CK provides a total of 440
attack “techniques” belonging to 27 different “tactics”. A tactic
is a behavior that supports a strategic goal; a technique is a
possible method of executing a tactic. Each technique has a
description explaining what the technique is, how it may be
executed, when it may be used, and various “procedures” for
performing it. There are 174 techniques belonging to 15 pre-
attack tactics, and 266 techniques belonging to 12 post-exploit
(Enterprise) tactics [1]. For example, the PRE-T1345 (Create
Custom Payloads) pre-attack technique, which belongs to the
Build Capabilities tactic, describes how an adversary creates
custom payloads with which malware can perform malicious
actions. Also, the post-exploit technique T1003 (Credential
Dumping), which belongs to the Credential Access tactic,
describes how an adversary obtains account login and password
information in the form of a hash or clear text password from
the operating system and software. A sequence of techniques
from different tactics used for an attack is what we call a
TTP (Tactics, Techniques, Procedures) chain. Moreover, the
combination of MITRE ATT&CK techniques in a TTP chain
represents various attack scenarios that can be composed in an
attack graph [2].
MITRE ATT&CK techniques and procedures provide be-
havioral observables for detecting attacks by analyzing cy-
ber artifacts collected from the network and end-system. The
structure of TTP allows analysts to organize which adversarial
actions belong to specific procedures that relate to specific
techniques and tactics, and helps the analyst to understand
what an adversary may be trying to achieve and how to better
defend against it. MITRE ATT&CK highlights many techniques
an adversary might use, but does not provide sufficient tips
on how the adversary might combine different techniques to
accomplish their goals. Thus, the technique associations an
analyst needs to construct TTP chains remain underspecified.
Technique associations are important because they help an
analyst to reason about adversarial behavior and predict un-
observed techniques based on the observed ones in the TTP
Chain. Without technique associations, an analyst will struggle
to reason efficiently about adversarial behavior as the search
space grows too large as the number of TTP chains increases
exponentially with the number of given techniques. Since little
to no work has been done regarding technique correlations, this
paper focuses on learning the attack technique associations that
manifest technique inter-dependencies and relationships based
on data of real-life attacks (66 Advanced Persistent Threats,
and 204 attacks by Software).
For these reasons, we developed a novel approach using
hierarchical clustering to infer technique associations that repre-
sent various technique inter-dependencies in a TTP chain. This
paper’s key contribution is discovering, with 95% confidence,
the fine-grain technique associations that support predictability
of attack behavior. Moreover, the hierarchical clustering devel-
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oped in this work can also be used to infer the coarse-grain
associations between techniques across different clusters. The
fine-grain associations demonstrate sequential, disjunctive, or
conjunctive relationships; the coarse-grain associations demon-
strate complementary relationships that complete the attack
chain.
To address these goals, we first explored various partitioned
clustering methods in order to group attack techniques that are
likely to co-occur together in the TTP Chain. We analyzed
a dataset of 270 APT and Software attacks which include a
total of 345 techniques using K-means clustering [3], Partition
Around Medoids (PAM) [4], and Fuzzy clustering [5]. How-
ever, we found that, due to the high dimensional data, such
clustering techniques could not reveal practically meaningful
associations, as the clusters are highly overlapping and difficult
to distinguish. We then developed hierarchical clustering, which
is more likely to be a suitable approach to represent the
sophisticated attack patterns, especially in APT attacks, since
it can model the correlations at various levels relative to the
height of the hierarchy.
There are three key challenges to achieve accurate research
results given our goals. First, we address the importance of
establishing a suitable distance metric for clustering in terms
of technique correlations in attack TTP chains while main-
taining interpretability. We integrate existing distance metrics
(Jaccard [6] distance and Phi Coefficient [7] correlational dis-
tance) that measure the co-occurrences and co-absences of the
techniques into clustering algorithms. Second, we address the
multi-dimensional relationships exhibited by attack techniques
by extending the agglomerative hierarchical clustering method
to obtain accurate results. In particular, we explore a range of
hierarchical linkage approaches to establish the optimal method
for binary multi-dimensional data. As a result, our developed
approach obtains the most compact technique associations.
Third, we address the challenge of validating the stability and
significance of the learned hierarchical clustering and technique
associations using a statistical hypothesis test. Our goal is
to ensure that the resulting associations will be statistically
significant at a rigorous confidence level ensuring that no more
than 5% of the results are due to random chance.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
the datasets used in this work, along with their challenges
and limitations. Section III presents the preliminary analysis
and Section IV presents our approach to inferring technique
associations. Sections V and VI present the evaluation and the
findings of our approach, respectively.
II. DATASETS
We analyzed two different datasets from MITRE ATT&CK.
The datasets referenced 270 total attack instances, made up of
209 unique techniques. In this section, we will describe the
nature of the datasets in more detail, as well as the challenges
they pose and their limitations.
A. Description
Stemming from MITRE’s classification of reported attacks,
the categories of the instances in the datasets are Advanced Per-
sistent Threats (APTs) and Software attacks. APT attacks are
synonymous to MITRE’s terminology of threat actor “Groups”,
while Software attacks encompass malware, ransomware, tro-
jans, Remote Access Tools (RATs), and other code used for
malicious purposes.
Each dataset consists of all the post-exploit techniques which
compose the TTP chain of any given APT or Software. In the
datasets, we treat each TTP chain as an attack instance and
every technique as a feature. The datasets are composed of
discrete variables, specifically, asymmetrical binary variables.
The outcome of the features is either 0 or 1, representing the
negative or positive occurrence of a technique in an attack
instance, respectively. An asymmetrical binary dataset refers to
a structure such that an outcome of 1, or the positive occurrence
of a technique, is more informative than an outcome of 0.
The first dataset contains 66 APT attack instances as pub-
lished in the MITRE ATT&CK Framework [1] on June 30,
2019. These APT attacks were mapped by MITRE from
publicly reported technique use, where the original references
are included in each technique description. The second dataset
contains 204 Software attack instances as published in the
MITRE ATT&CK Framework [1] on July 30, 2019. MITRE
also mapped Software attacks from publicly reported technique
use and accounts for the capability of the software adversary
to use a technique. We downloaded the datasets from MITRE
ATT&CK in json format using the ATT&CK Navigator [8].
B. Challenges
We faced two challenges with the datasets. The first chal-
lenge involved adjusting for the differing complexities among
the Software and APT attack instances. The second challenge
addressed MITRE’s constant updates to the ATT&CK frame-
work.
For the first challenge, we addressed the ramifications of
less composite attack instances. Since APT attack instances
represent a full campaign containing several high-level and
high-impact goals, their TTP chain is more complex than that of
Software attack instances, which are typically carried out for
specific low-level purposes. This implicit difference between
APT and Software attacks is reflected where many of the
Software attack instances are comprised of very few techniques.
Attack instances with scarce technique occurrences can alter
our results and create misleading technique associations due to
less complex Software attacks reporting the use of techniques
that are not combined in any meaningful way. For that reason,
we decided to only include Software attack instances which
employ at least five different techniques across five different
tactics.
For the second challenge, we addressed the common up-
dates to the ATT&CK Framework and the discovery of newly
reported attacks. We emphasize a transparent analysis method-
ology, as recommended by [9], so our work could be repeated
as the datasets evolve.
C. Limitations
The datasets have two salient limitations. The first limitation
is described by MITRE as a limit of their data collection
process. MITRE states that the APT and Software attacks are
not representative of all possible techniques used by the actors
associated with the observed data, rather a subset of what
has been available through public and open source reporting.
Therefore, the actual techniques these attacks utilized, or the
ground truth, is difficult to determine or even discover.
The second limitation of the attacks in the datasets is
mapping biases. We recognize that heuristics and automated
mappings of threat reports to techniques may inadvertently
possess a degree of proclivity. For these reasons, our analysis
provides an approach for characterizing APT and Software
attacks that can constantly be enhanced.
III. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Our process of knowledge discovery through clustering in-
volved several stages of analysis. In this section, we will
discuss our preliminary analysis using partitioned clustering,
particularly K-means [3], PAM [4], and Fuzzy [5] clustering.
The preliminary results show the true complexity of inferring
accurate and applicable technique associations.
A. Partitioned Clustering of Techniques
Partitioned clustering is used to classify observations into
groups, or clusters, based on their similarity. The three par-
titioned clustering methods we investigated require choosing
the optimal number of clusters, K, as described below in
Section III-A1. The details of the clustering algorithms will
be discussed in Section III-A2, and the validation methods are
discussed in Section III-A3.
1) Choosing the Optimal K: In order to perform any type of
partitioned clustering, the number of clusters must be specified
in advance. While there are numerous ways to determine the
optimal number of clusters, we found the Elbow and Silhouette
methods appropriate for the nature of the datasets. Throughout
this paper, we will use k for any number of clusters, and K
for the optimal number of clusters in partitioned clustering.
The Elbow method chooses K by minimizing the within-
cluster variance, which is calculated using Euclidean distances,
a distance metric inappropriate for binary data; see Remark
1 for details. Thus, we customized the use of the Elbow
method by incorporating the dissimilarity matrix. Specifically,
we computed the cluster variance by summing the squared
dissimilarity divided by the size of each cluster. Then, as
represented by the name, K is determined by the elbow, the
point at which the cluster variance by dissimilarity suddenly
decreases.
The Silhouette method measures how well a data point be-
longs in a cluster by computing the pairwise distances between
all the objects in every cluster, using any specified distance
metric. In order to achieve well clustered results, the distance
between the clusters, known as the silhouette width, should be
Analysis/OptimalKElbowPAMPhiAPT.png
(a) Elbow method
nalysis/OptimalKSilhouettePAMPhiAPT.png
(b) Silhouette method
Fig. 1: K for APT attacks
Analysis/OptimalKElbowPAMPhiMalware.png
(a) Elbow method
An lysis/OptimalKSilhouettePAMPhiMalware.png
(b) Silhouette method
Fig. 2: K for Software attacks
maximized. For that reason, K is chosen as the point with the
highest silhouette width.
The Elbow and Silhouette methods are portrayed for both
datasets in Figures 1 and 2. Observe that both methods resulted
in K = 14 for the dataset of APT attacks. However, for
the dataset of Software attacks, the Elbow method determined
K = 16, while the Silhouette method found K = 2 as the
first optimal and K = 16 as the second optimal. Therefore, we
decided to use K = 16 as the optimal number of clusters for
the Software attacks dataset.
2) Clustering Algorithms: The three partitioned clustering
methods considered in the preliminary analysis are K-means,
PAM, and Fuzzy Clustering.
K-means is one of the most common algorithms for cluster-
ing a dataset into K clusters. The objective is to minimize the
total-within cluster variation, defined as the sum of squared
Euclidean distances between items and their corresponding
centroid [10]. The total within-cluster sum of squares for a
specific cluster Ck will be denoted as W kss, and is formally
expressed as
W kss =
∑
xi∈Ck
(xi − µk)2, k = 1, . . . ,K, (1)
where xi represents a data point belonging to the cluster
Ck, and µk is the centroid and mean value of all the points
assigned to cluster Ck. We deemed K-means clustering as
inappropriate for the datasets for the following two reasons:
(1) the total within-cluster sum of squares computation uses
Euclidean distances, a distance metric inappropriate for the
binary datasets; see Remark 1 for details; and (2) the way the
centroid is defined in K-means clustering creates a value that
cannot be mapped to the original dataset. Moreover, finding
the difference between binary points and a mean centroid will
indeed result in all the points with a value of 1 to be tied, and
all the points with a value of 0 to be tied. K-means clustering
does not address ties, and in fact will arbitrarily assign points
to a cluster [11].
PAM, which is sometimes referred to as K-medoids, is built
upon choosing cluster medoids that represent every cluster.
Cluster medoids correspond to the most centrally located data
point in a cluster. The objective of PAM clustering is to
minimize the sum of the dissimilarities between every data
point in a cluster and the cluster medoid. The use of medoids as
actual data points rather than centroids prompts PAM clustering
as a more robust partitioned clustering algorithm to outliers.
Therefore, PAM clustering is less sensitive to noise in the data,
compared to K-means clustering [10]. In addition, the dissim-
ilarity measure for PAM clustering can utilize any distance
metric specified, allowing the flexibility to use the appropriate
distance metric for the datasets considered in this work.
Finally, Fuzzy clustering is different than K-means and PAM
clustering in the aspect that cluster memberships are rather
probabilistic. Using a degree of fuzziness, cluster membership
probabilities are computed by incorporating that value with
the dissimilarity between every point and the medoid. Fuzzy
clustering can be visualized by taking the cluster with the
highest probability for each data point. Note that, the Fuzzy
clustering used in this work follows the Fuzzy analysis cluster-
ing algorithm, in contrast with the Fuzzy C-means algorithm
which follows K-means centroids and Euclidean distances.
Fuzzy analysis clustering allows us to specify the suitable
distance metrics for the datasets.
3) Clustering Validation: We validated the performance of
partitioned clustering by measuring the intra-cluster compact-
ness and inter-cluster separation using a silhouette analysis and
the Dunn index. A silhouette analysis after clustering measures
the proximity each technique in one cluster to a technique in its
neighboring clustering. A silhouette width near one indicates
that the object is well-clustered and separated from neighboring
clusters. A silhouette width less than 0 suggests that the object
is not well-clustered and is lying in overlapping clusters or
between clusters. The average silhouette width is simply an
average of the silhouette width for each object clustered, and
measures the overall performance of partitioned clustering on
a dataset. The Dunn index computes the ratio of the diameter
of the clusters and the distance between clusters, and should
be maximized for a well-clustered dataset.
B. Preliminary Results
The cluster plot for each paritioned clustering method and
corresponding dataset portrays K clusters represented in differ-
ent colors, where the axes are reduced to two dimensions for vi-
sualization purposes. The results of PAM and Fuzzy clustering
for the APT and Software datasets are shown in Figures 3 and
4, respectively. Note that these preliminary clustering results
utilized the Phi coefficient correlational distance, discussed in
further detail in Section IV-A.
(a) PAM Clustering (b) Fuzzy Clustering
Fig. 3: Partitioned Clustering APT attacks
(a) PAM Clustering (b) Fuzzy Clustering
Fig. 4: Partitioned Clustering Software attacks
It is evident that the clusters in Figures 3 and 4 are not well
partitioned, and in fact the overlap of the techniques makes
it difficult to distinguish any potential technique associations.
A silhouette analysis and the Dunn index also confirm that the
partitioned clustering of the techniques do not yield accurate or
explainable results. The average silhouette width for the PAM
clustering of the APT and Software attack datasets are 0.18
and 0.08, respectively. The clusters silhouette plot is shown in
Figure 5, where each bar represents a technique in the dataset,
and every distinct color is a cluster in the PAM cluster plot.
The Dunn index of the PAM clustering for the APT attacks
dataset is 0.24 and for the Software attacks dataset is 0.15.
Since Fuzzy clustering is based on probabilistic memberships,
a silhouette analysis and Dunn index cannot be reported,
however, analyzing the technique cluster memberships revealed
that the probabilities follow a near uniform distribution. This
strongly suggests the lack of well-separated partitions between
clusters or interpretability of Fuzzy clustering.
Although the partitioned clustering did not exhibit any clear
patterns, we did find some interesting results in the PAM clus-
tering of the APT dataset in Figure 3a. For example, techniques
T1193 (Spearphishing Attachment) and T1204 (User Execution)
appeared on the bottom right of cluster 13. Interestingly, these
two techniques are strongly correlated in a TTP Chain, as
specifically described in the MITRE ATT&CK Framework [1].
(a) APT attacks (b) Software attacks
Fig. 5: Clusters Silhouette Plot for PAM Clustering
This example indicates that, while there are no clear patterns in
the partitioned clustering, there may be a potential for another
clustering algorithm that can capture the high dimensional
and complex nature of the data. In order to be able to infer
accurate and practically meaningful technique associations, our
approach, involving hierarchical clustering, is introduced below.
IV. INFERRING ATTACK TECHNIQUE ASSOCIATIONS
In this section, we will discuss the unique approach we
developed in order to infer attack technique associations with a
high level of confidence. Section IV-A identifies the appropriate
distance metric to be used in this work, while Section IV-B
discusses the analysis of clustering tendency. Section IV-C in-
troduces hierarchical clustering, and Section IV-D presents the
statistical hypothesis test performed for inferring the ultimate
statistically significant technique associations at a confidence
level of 95%.
A. Distance Metrics
Clustering is performed on objects using measures of similar-
ity, or distance metrics. As computing distances differs per the
nature of the dataset, it is imperative to use the suitable distance
measure for the variables in the datasets considered in this
work. With the datasets being composed of binary variables,
we determined that Jaccard [6] distances and Phi Coefficient [7]
correlational distances are the most appropriate.
The Jaccard similarity between any two techniques Ti and
Tj is defined as follows
Js(Ti, Tj) =
n11
n01 + n10 + n11
, (2)
where n is the total number of attack instances in the datasets
and n01, n10, and n11 represent the frequency of attacks
corresponding to values of Ti and Tj , described in Table I.
Note that, the value of n00 is not considered in the computation
of the Jaccard similarity index in equation (2), rather only the
co-occurrences are taken into account. The Jaccardian distance
between techniques Ti and Tj measures the dissimilarity, and is
defined as the complement of the Jaccard similarity, that is, 1-
Js(Ti, Tj). The Jaccardian distance between techniques Ti and
Tj can be interpreted as the ratio of their intersection divided
by their union. While this metric is appropriate for the nature
of the datasets considered here, it may not yield explainable
technique associations.
The Phi Coefficient is an empirical non-parametric correla-
tion measure specifically for binary data. The Phi Coefficient
correlation between any two techniques Ti and Tj is defined
as
rφ(Ti, Tj) =
n11n00 − n10n01
n1·n0·n·1n·0
, (3)
where all values of n are defined in Table I.
TABLE I: Distance Metrics Empirical Values
Tj = 1 Tj = 0 total
Ti = 1 n11 n10 n1·
Ti = 0 n01 n00 n0·
total n·1 n·0 n
As expressed in equation (3), rφ(Ti, Tj) measures the fre-
quency of the co-occurrences and co-absences of techniques
Ti and Tj . The Phi Coefficient distance between techniques
Ti and Tj is defined as the complement of the correlation,
that is 1-rφ(Ti, Tj). Since the Phi Coefficient is a correlational
metric between Ti and Tj , it provides the capability of deducing
whether techniques Ti and Tj are correlated at a certain level
due to their co-occurrences and co-absences in the TTP Chains.
Therefore, the Phi Coefficient metric is suitable for the binary
datasets and provides an easily interpretable conclusion.
Remark 1 (Unsuitable Distance Metric): One of the most
commonly used distance metrics applied for clustering is the
Euclidean distance. Although the Euclidean distance metric is
typically applied for continuous variables, it is not appropriate
for a binary dataset. The Euclidean measure drives the calcu-
lated distance for a binary dataset to most often be tied and,
thus, causes the loss of distinct measures of similarity of the
variables.
B. Assessing Clustering Tendency
Before performing clustering on the datasets, we measured
the clusterability of the data. This process, known as assessing
clustering tendency, involves evaluating whether the dataset
contains meaningful clusters. This is important because clus-
tering methods can often return clusters even in the absence
of notable groups in the dataset. In other words, unknowingly
applying a clustering method to a dataset will divide the data
into clusters, regardless if they are relevant [10]. In addition,
assessing clustering tendency using the two appropriate distance
metrics, Jaccard and Phi Coefficient, will determine which
metric is the most suitable for further cluster analysis.
The approach used in this work, known as the Hopkins
statistic [12], is defined as the probability a given dataset
D is generated by a random data distribution. The idea is
to compare the distance between the points in dataset D to
the distance between points drawn from a randomly simulated
dataset DR. Here, D is defined to be either the dataset of APT
attacks or Software attacks. We calculated the Hopkins statistic
for the datasets as described in Algorithm 1. Let HJ denote
Algorithm 1 Hopkins Statistic Algorithm
1: procedure HOPKINS(D, m)
2: Sample uniformly m points (T1, ...., Tm) from given
dataset D.
3: for all Ti ∈ D do
4: di ← dist(Ti, Tj), where Tj is the nearest neighbor
. Compute the distance between Ti and Tj using Jaccard
or Phi Coefficient distances
5: end for
6: Generate a simulated dataset DR from a random
Bernoulli distribution with m points (R1, ...., Rm) with the
same variance as the given dataset D.
7: for all Ri ∈ DR do
8: d˜i ← dist(Ri, Rj), where Rj is the nearest neigh-
bor . Compute the distance between Ri and Rj using
Jaccard or Phi Coefficient distances
9: end for
10: Calculate the Hopkins statistic as
H =
∑m
i=1 d˜i∑m
i=1 di +
∑m
i=1 d˜i
. (4)
11: end procedure
the Hopkins statistic computed using Jaccard distances, and
Hφ denote the Hopkins statistic computed using Phi Coeffi-
cient correlational distances. Note that, Step 6 in Algorithm
1 involves generating DR using a Bernoulli distribution. This
agrees with the nature of the binary variables considered here.
To further understand H, assume D was uniformly dis-
tributed and lacking cluster tendencies. Then, the values of∑m
i=1 d˜i and
∑m
i=1 di in equation 4 would expectedly be close
to one another, making H = 0.5. Therefore, if H ≈ 0.5, we
conclude that the dataset D is uniformly distributed and does
not contain any meaningful clusters. However, if clusters are
present in D, then we anticipate H ≈ 1, and conclude that
performing a cluster analysis would yield meaningful results.
On the other hand, if clusters are not present in D, then H ≈ 0,
and we conclude that the data points in D are considered to be
regularly spaced, neither random nor clustered.
We computed the Hopkins statistic for both datasets. For
the first dataset of APT attacks, HJ = 0.51 and Hφ = 0.60.
For the second dataset of Software attacks, we report HJ =
0.55 and Hφ = 0.63. For both of the datasets, we found the
reported value of Hφ to be higher than HJ, indicating that
using the Phi Coefficient correlational distance results in the
datasets having a better clustering tendency. For this reason,
all our reported results will be expressed in Phi Coefficient
correlational distances.
C. Hierarchical Clustering
Hierarchical clustering is a different method of clustering
in which a specified distance matrix is used as the criteria
to create a tree-based representation of the data. The tree-
like structure resulting from hierarchical clustering is known
as a dendrogram, a multilevel hierarchy of the objects being
clustered. The number of clusters K need not be specified
in advance, rather cutting the tree at a specified height after
clustering allows for generating clusters depending on any
desired constraints.
Although there are many hierarchical clustering algorithms,
we developed a hierarchical clustering method specifically
tailored for the datasets considered here. Our approach ex-
tends agglomerative hierarchical clustering with Ward’s link-
age. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering refers to a bottom-up
method, where every object in the dataset begins as a separate
cluster, or leaf, in the tree. The leaves are then combined
into bigger clusters based on the values of the distance ma-
trix. Agglomerative clustering is best for finding clusters of
objects with the greatest similarity as it focuses on complete
local information from the dataset during fusion decisions,
and, therefore, creating smaller clusters where the objects are
the most similar [13]. During the process of agglomerative
clustering, combining multiple larger groups of leaves requires
a linkage method. Our linkage method for inferring technique
associations uses Ward’s linkage method. Ward’s linkage cal-
culates the distance between larger clusters by computing the
sum of squares of the distances, divided by the product of the
cardinality of the two clusters. In addition to Ward’s linkage
creating more compact clusters during hierarchical clustering,
Ward’s is less susceptible to noise and outliers within the
clustering data [14].
Other types of hierarchical clustering and linkage methods,
such as divisive hierarchical clustering and single and complete
linkage, do not possess the same qualities of compactness
and robustness as our approach of agglomerative hierarchical
clustering with Ward’s linkage. Divisive hierarchical clustering
refers to a top-down approach at which the objects in the dataset
are recursively split into clusters until each object becomes a
singleton. During each iteration of division, the split decision
is made by comparing the dissimilarity of the objects to one
another [13]. Divisive clustering does not conform with the
objective of inferring technique associations that represent cor-
relations between techniques that are at the highest degrees of
similarity in attack instances. Similarly, we deemed other well-
known linkage techniques such as single linkage and complete
linkage as not suitable for our goal. Single-linkage, otherwise
known as minimum linkage, creates long-loose clusters, and
often cannot separate clusters in the hierarchy in the presence of
noise. Complete linkage possesses the tendency to unseeingly
break larger clusters, which may does not contribute to our
goal of maintaining the relationships between associations [15].
For those reasons, our inference of the technique associations
used agglomerative hierarchical clustering with Ward’s linkage.
The results of divisive hierarchical clustering for the Software
and APT attack datasets are reported in Figures 13 and 14 in
the Appendix. In addition, a representation of the hierarchical
clustering using different linkage methods is portrayed in Figure
15.
We extended the agglomerative hierarchical Ward’s link-
age algorithm to incorporate the Phi coefficient correlational
distance metric for the APT and Software attacks datasets.
Algorithm 2 Statistical Test of Hierarchical Clustering
1: procedure TEST(TD)
2: for possible k ← 1 to 100 do
3: hk ← cutoff height of TD that creates k clusters
4: for j ← 1 to 1,000 do
5: Generate a null tree, T 0j , using agglomerative
Ward’s linkage from a random Bernoulli distribution with
the same variance as that of TD
6: h0k,j ← cutoff height for T 0j that creates k
clusters
7: end for
8: p← count h0k,j ≤ hk / 1,000
9: end for
10: Find the first value stored in p that is ≤ 0.05 to conclude
statistical significance at a 95% confidence level.
11: end procedure
Performing this hierarchical clustering will grant the ability
of inferring meaningful and accurate technique associations
by encompassing clusters that have the highest degrees of
correlation.
Although we now have the final dendrogram of the learned
hierarchical clustering tree, we are still not able to infer the
significant technique associations because we need to determine
a cutoff in the tree. Our unique approach to assess the validity
and derive the statistically significant cutoff for the technique
associations is discussed in the next section.
D. Statistical Hypothesis Testing of Hierarchical Clustering
After developing the hierarchical clustering tree, the final
steps are, first, to assess the validity of the tree and, second,
create a cutoff at a height of the dendrogram in order to create
the final clusters. For the datasets, the final clusters learned
from the hierarchical clustering tree will represent the technique
associations. The novel approach used in this work addresses
these two aspects by performing a statistical hypothesis test on
the learned agglomerative Ward’s linkage hierarchical cluster-
ing tree, which will be denoted as TD. Specifically, a statistical
hypothesis test will analyze the validity of the clusters in TD
by comparing the learned tree to a tree resulted from a null
distribution, and will allow us to infer statistically significant
results at the desired confidence level [16].
The null tree used for the statistical hypothesis test is
generated from a random Bernoulli distribution with the same
variance as that of the dataset, and will be denoted as T 0. If
the clusters in TD are considerably different than that of T 0 at
the specified cutoff, then the learned tree will yield statistically
significant results. An outcome of a statistically significant hier-
archical tree grants the conclusion that the resulting associations
are far from random chance, providing validity to the technique
associations. The approach is further explained in Algorithm 2.
E. Experimentation and results
First, we determined the cutoff value of the agglomerative
Ward’s clustering tree for the dataset of APT attacks and
(a) APT attacks (b) Software attacks
Fig. 6: Hypothesis Test of Learned Hierarchical Clustering
Software attacks at a rigorous 95% confidence level. The
resulted p-values are shown in Figure 6. The blue vertical line
in Figures 6a and 6b correspond to the statistically significant
amount of associations, 37 and 61 associations for the APT and
Software attacks, respectively.
The results of the learned hierarchical clustering tree for the
dataset of APT attacks is portrayed in Figure 7 and for the
dataset of Software attacks, Figure 8. Each cluster, or fine-grain
association, in the figure is surrounded by a gray dashed box,
and is represented in a different color in the tree.
V. EVALUATION
In addition to the statistical hypothesis test providing validity
to the learned hierarchical clustering presented in Section IV-D,
in this section we will present two methods to evaluate the
accuracy of the learned technique associations.
A. Measuring Mutual Information
We evaluated the learned attack technique associations using
an information theoretic approach. We computed the mutual
information of the techniques in the fine-grain clusters, as well
as the coarse-grain clusters directly from the datasets. Mutual
information allows us to evaluate the learned correlations by
identifying the relatedness or dependence between any two
techniques within the same cluster (fine-grain) or across joint
clusters (coarse-grain) independent of the assumptions of the
underlying probability distributions [17]. In order to be able to
compare the mutual information between different associations,
we performed our evaluation using the normalized mutual
information (NMI) [18].
First, we performed our analysis of the fine-grain associa-
tions for both datasets. This involved a technique-based NMI
measure as well as a cluster-based NMI measure. We com-
puted the technique-based measure by calculating the NMI for
every pairwise combination of techniques in the same cluster.
This quantitatively represents the maximum predictability each
technique possesses based on its cluster assignment. As for
the cluster-based measure, we computed the NMI for each
technique in the cluster and found the average, yielding a
measure of how predictable that cluster is. We identified the
threshold of the NMI value for the fine-grain analysis by
empirically assessing the technique occurrences in the datasets.
Fig. 7: Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering of APT Attacks
Fig. 8: Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering of Software Attacks
We found that an NMI value of 0.25 is equivalent to having a
co-occurrence of 75%, which shows that the learned correlation
is practically useful for prediction. The complement cumulative
distribution function of the fine-grain analysis is shown for
both datasets in Figures 9 and 10. The results of the fine-
grain analysis show that from the dataset of APT attacks, 78%
of the techniques (Figure 9a) and 75% of the clusters (Figure
9b) indicate high predictability. Similarly for Software attacks,
60% of the techniques and clusters (Figure 10a and Figure
10b) from the learned hierarchical clustering tree indicate high
predictability.
Moreover, we evaluated the coarse-grain associations by
computing the inter-cluster NMI for both datasets. We measured
the inter-cluster NMI by finding the neighboring connecting
cluster in the next level of the hierarchical clustering tree and
computing the NMI between the techniques in the connected
clusters. The complement cumulative distribution function of
the coarse-grain analysis is shown for both datasets in Figure
11. The results of the coarse-grain analysis show that, 75%
of the inter-cluster cluster correlations for the APT attacks
(Figure 11a) and 60% of the inter-cluster correlations for the
Software attacks (Figure 11b) indicate high predictability of
their connected cluster at the next level of the hierarchy.
In Section VI, we will discuss examples of fine-grain and
coarse-grain associations, as well as the relationships they
manifest in further detail.
B. Evaluation Based on Domain Experts
We also recruited 6 Cybersecurity experts from both aca-
demic institutions and government who have at least 5 years
of experience in the area of cyber threat intelligence and are
familiar with the MITRE ATT&CK Framework. We provided
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Fig. 9: Analysis of Fine-grain Associations for APT Attacks
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Fig. 10: Analysis of Fine-grain Associations for Software Attacks
each expert with an evaluation rubric to label each association
as “agree”, “disagree”, or “neutral” along with the correspond-
ing justifications. The experts confirmed the presence of strong
correlations for 93% of the fine-grain technique associations,
and 90% of the coarse-grain associations. In addition, when
investigating the fine-grain and coarse-grain associations that
were labeled as “disagree” or “neutral”, we found those as-
sociations difficult to justify since the techniques in those
associations have low occurrences in the datasets.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section we will discuss some findings and association
examples based on our clustering analysis.
Hierarchical clustering reflects the complexities of APT
and Software attacks: The average size of the fine-grain
associations of the Software attacks is smaller than that of the
APT attacks. This is because the Software attacks typically
extend a smaller number of tactics, while APT attacks are
typically more complex and span several tactics in the attack
chain.
Fine-grain associations: There are 37 and 61 fine-grain
clusters for APT and Software attacks, respectively. These intra-
cluster correlations represent various relationships (conjunctive,
disjunctive or sequential) between techniques within the same
cluster. Although the clustering itself may not reveal the kind of
relationship between techniques, this can be identified by expert
inspection based on techniques functions. Will will discuss two
examples of this.
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Fig. 11: Analysis of Coarse-Grain Association
In the first example, the cluster composed of {T1013 (Port
Monitors), T1494 (Runtime Data Manipulation), T1493 (Trans-
mitted Data Manipulation), T1115 (Clipboard Data), T1485
(Data Destruction), T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact), and
T1487 (Disk Structure Wipe)} represents an attack pattern
for accomplishing data destruction as an adversarial goal.
The adversary starts with T1013 to load malicious code at
startup through a DLL. Then, the adversary may choose to
perform T1494 or T1493 to manipulate runtime or transmitted
data to negatively affect a business process. Afterwards, the
adversary may collect different sources of data, such as T1115
that can later impact data availability. Finally, the adversary
performs one or more of 1485, T1486, or T1487 to cause data
unavailability. Attackers usually plan for multiple techniques
(from the tactic) that are performed concurrently (cognitively)
or selectively (as alternatives) in order to maximize the potential
of success. Figure 12 shows the relationship manifested in this
association.
As a second example, the {T1028 (Windows Remote Man-
agement), T1038 (DLL Search Order Hijacking), T1030 (Data
Transfer Limits), and T1126 (Network Share Connection Re-
moval)} association represents an attack pattern in the TTP
Chain of an information stealer (e.g., Threat Group 3390 [1]).
First, the adversary executes malicious code leveraging the
Windows Remote management protocol as enabled by tech-
nique T1028. As a result, the adversary can then replace or
modify a DLL to gain privilege escalation and persistence
using (T1038). Afterwards, the adversary will employ technique
T1030 to exfiltrate collected data in fixed size chunks to avoid
data transfer alerts. Finally, the adversary cleans up the traces of
their operation by detaching the network shares, (T1126), after
exfiltration for defense evasion. Evidently, the relationship in
this association is sequential.
Coarse-grain associations: The fine-grain associations are
combined together at various levels to form bigger clusters in
the hierarchy. We call this inter-cluster association coarse-grain.
There are 35 first-level coarse-grains associations in the APT
attack hierarchical clustering tree. As we observed, the coarse-
grain associations show complementary techniques performed
across various tactics in the TTP Chain. For instance, the
second example association discussed above ({T1028 (Windows
Fig. 12: Fine-grain Association Example
Remote Management), T1038 (DLL Search Order Hijacking),
T1030 (Data Transfer Limits), and T1126 (Network Share Con-
nection Removal)}) is connected to another association {T1055
(Process Injection) and T1089 (Disabling Security Tools)} at
the next level of the hierarchy. An attacker may use the latter
cluster to obtain defense evasion during the former cluster.
That is, T1055 for executing code masked under a legitimate
process and T1089 for disabling security tools are both used to
avoid detection. For an APT, this complementary relationship
is critical to their goal, and the coarse-grain association aids in
identifying the larger attack chain.
Interestingly, many of the associations inferred by our ap-
proach, as examples discussed above, may not be easily de-
duced by experts in the field. The fine-grain and coarse-gran
associations go beyond what experts can manually discover.
Thus, the knowledge from this work can be used to further
advance the ability to predict adversarial behavior outside the
limits of expertise or heuristics.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Overall, in this work we accurately learn the fine-grain
and coarse-grain technique associations based on real-life APT
and Software attack datasets. These associations are important
because they enable the prediction of adversarial behavior based
on observed techniques, which can be directly applied to attack
diagnosis and threat mitigation. Our approach first involves
establishing the suitable distance metric of the datasets and
extending hierarchical clustering algorithms in order to infer
explainable fine-grain and coarse-grain associations. Moreover,
we deduce statistically significant correlations and assess the
validity of our learned hierarchical clustering tree by perform-
ing a hypothesis test and ensure that no more than 5% of the
fine-grain associations are due to random chance. Our approach
leads to the inference of 37 fine-grain technique associations
from the APT attacks dataset and 61 from the Software attacks
dataset. Then, we evaluate the learned fine-grain and coarse-
grain associations using mutual information, and the results
show that 78% of the fine-grain and 75% of the coarse-
grain technique associations exhibit high predictability for APT
attacks.
Our approach encountered a few limitations that provide
avenues for future work. First, we will work on collecting a
larger dataset of real-life attacks in order to increase the number
and the quality of technique clusters and associations. Second,
we will investigate an approach, involving fuzzy hierarchical
clustering, to explore probabilistic technique associations as
well as other methods methods to reveal precondition and post-
condition relationships.
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APPENDIX
Figure 13 and Figure 14 display divisive clustering results.
Figure 15 displays agglomerative clustering results.
Fig. 13: Divisive Hierarchical Clustering of APT Attacks
Fig. 14: Divisive Hierarchical Clustering of Software Attacks
Fig. 15: Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering Linkage Methods of APT Attacks
